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INTRODUCTION
Alan Turing, in his famous 1950 paper, “Computing
Machinery and Intelligence,” wrote, “we may hope that
machines will eventually compete with men in all purely
intellectual fields.”1 This distant aspiration, expressed in the
context of whether a machine can be indistinguishable from a
human,2 may soon be a modern-day reality as technological
breakthroughs bring science closer to developing machines
endowed with natural intellect—the concept of artificial
intelligence (AI).3 Over the past decade, advancements in big
data, machine learning, algorithms, and computational power
have brought research surrounding AI to new heights as the
world looks to technology to address society’s greatest

1. See Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 236
433, 460 (1950), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251299?origin=JSTOR-pdf
(considering the question of whether machines can think).
2. See Steven Harnad, Minds, Machines and Turing: The
Indistinguishability of Indistinguishables, 9 J. OF LOGIC, LANGUAGE, & INFO.
425 (2000), https://www.jstor.org/stable/40180236?seq=1 (describing the Turing
test as a test of whether a machine can act indistinguishably from a human).
3. See Max Tegmark, Benefits & Risks of Artificial Intelligence, FUTURE
OF LIFE INST., https://futureoflife.org/background/benefits-risks-of-artificial
-intelligence/ (defining general and narrow concepts of artificial intelligence);
see also NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016) at 6,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/micr
osites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf
(offering
alternative
definitions of AI concepts and suggesting a problem-solution taxonomy for
defining AI).
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challenges.4 However, just as our understanding of the
technology progresses, so does the complexity of the underlying
social and legal issues presented by computer systems that may
one day be fully capable of making decisions exclusive of human
intervention.5
AI has in recent years been thrust to the vanguard of
technical development as nation states, private industries, and
researchers seek to comprehend and exploit its potential.6 While
society has often embraced scientific advancements designed to
augment and better the human experience, the foreseeable and
speculative perils of AI create uncertainty surrounding its
proliferation across society.7 Despite this debate, it is likely that
AI will be a disruptive force across industries, and cybersecurity8
is no exception.9 As security and privacy move to the forefront of
business considerations, corporations and governments are
increasingly turning towards automated processes to ensure
compliance, avoid liability, and streamline operations in an era
of big data.10 The application of AI technologies to cybersecurity
is in a novel state; however, fully autonomous network defense

4. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3 at 7 (summarizing current
developments that represent the state of AI as of 2016).
5. See Tomaso Falchetta, Profiling and Automated Decision Making: Is
Artificial Intelligence Violating Your Right to Privacy?, UNITED NATIONS RES.
INST.
FOR
SOC.
DEV.
(Dec.
5,
2018),
http://www.
unrisd.org/TechAndHumanRights-Falchetta.
6. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 35 (discussing
challenges of AI in the context of international relations and role of AI in
international conflicts, including armed conflicts).
7. See Tegmark, supra note 3 (noting that “the boundaries of AI can be
uncertain and have tended to shift over time”).
8. Cybersecurity is a subset of information security. For the purposes of
this paper, cybersecurity refers to preventing, detecting, and responding to
cyberattacks. Network security is a subset of cybersecurity that focuses on
protecting data sent through or stored on networks. This paper focuses at times
on network defense systems to highlight the underlying legal and policy
considerations associated with information security and cybersecurity. For
brevity, this paper does not fully detail various cybersecurity techniques. Only
where necessary to build upon the legal analysis does this paper expound on the
underlying technical considerations.
9. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 35 (noting that AI
already has an important role in cybersecurity).
10. See Travis Greene, Explaining the ‘New Normal’ in Cybersecurity to the
C-Suite,
FORBES
(Sept.
12,
2018),
https://
www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/09/12/explaining-the-new-normal
-in-cybersecurity-to-the-c-suite/#3e668cf568a8 (describing the increased focus
on cyber risk management by executive boards).
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systems may be at society’s doorstep.11 Autonomous
cybersecurity systems are expected to offer significant
advantages in an era where the threat landscape is continuously
expanding, and resources are increasingly strained.12
Autonomous cybersecurity systems are driven by data, and
the European Union General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) is an unavoidable moderator in this regard.13 The GDPR
places significant restraints on the collection and use of data in
Europe.14 Moreover, the extraterritorial nature of the regulation
compounds the impact it has on global industries.15 This paper
is designed to expand discussion surrounding AI, cybersecurity,
and data privacy through an exploration of the GDPR and the
legal challenges this regulation poses for autonomous
cybersecurity systems.16 This paper contends that today’s AIbased cybersecurity systems are likely capable of complying with
the GDPR.17 However, absent a technical solution, maintaining
compliance will becoming increasingly difficult as these systems
achieve greater autonomy.18 Part I of this paper examines the
practical and technical aspects of AI-based network defense
systems. This includes a foundational exploration of the utility
of autonomous network defense, current limitations and longterm prospects, and a brief technical overview of how AI is
applied in the cyber domain. Part II examines the GDPR and
analyzes the key privacy implications and legal challenges that

11. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 36 (describing
automated cybersecurity systems that have been developed, which represent a
first step toward “the development of advanced, autonomous systems that can
detect, evaluate, and patch software vulnerabilities before adversaries have a
chance to exploit them.”).
12. Id.
13. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and Council of
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), Article 2, 2016 O.J. L 119/1
[hereinafter GDPR].
14. See GDPR, art. 5; see also Part II Section A, infra.
15. See generally Bhaskar Chakravorti, Why the Rest of the World Can’t
Free Ride on Europe’s GDPR Rules, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/04/why-the-rest-of-world-cant-free-ride-on-europesgdpr-rules (explaining that the global nature of information technology has the
effect of imposing Europe’s GDPR Rules on the rest of the world).
16. See Part II Section A, infra.
17. See Part II Section B, infra.
18. See Part II Section C, infra.
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this regulation poses for the development of AI-based network
defense systems. Part II concludes with a discussion of
legislative considerations for any future US data privacy law.
Some that have been suggested include exemptions for data
processing related to information security, inclusion of liability
limitations, establishing permitted used of anonymized data,
and defining permitted uses of repurposed data.19
I.

AI-DRIVEN CYBERSECURITY SYSTEMS: A PRACTICAL
AND TECHNICAL EXPLORATION

Enthusiasm for AI technologies has perhaps never been
greater.20 The tangible realizations and speculative promises of
AI have prompted governments and industries to look towards
AI as a transformational technology capable of disrupting nearly
all industries.21 An area that has received significant attention
in this regard is cybersecurity.22 The advent of cyberspace has
fostered blended worlds of overlapping technologies, which are
themselves vectors for disruption. For nation states, corporate
entities, and private citizens alike, security in cyberspace is
paramount to existing safely in an interconnected world.23
However, adequate security in this domain remains elusive as a
growing threat landscape and limited resources create more
challenges than solutions.24 This has prompted those in the
cybersecurity domain to focus on AI as a remedial measure.25
Section A explores the utility of AI in the cybersecurity domain
and discusses the critical role that AI and machine learning will
19. Id.
20. See Despite Enthusiasm for AI Adoption, Governments are Experiencing
Challenges,
HELP
NET
SECURITY,
Oct.
28,
2019,
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/10/28/government-ai-adoption
-challenges/ (noting that government leaders and senior information technology
decision-makers in Finland, France, Germany, Norway, and U.K. are optimistic
and enthusiastic about using AI in their operations).
21. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 3 (describing U.S.
concerns surrounding AI and noting that “AI holds the potential to be a major
driver of economic growth and social progress, if industry, civil society,
government, and the public work together to support development of the
technology with thoughtful attention to its potential and to managing its
risks.”).
22. Id. at 36.
23. See id. (urging government and private entities to cooperate to apply AI
to cybersecurity and ensure the security of AI systems.).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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likely play in the future of network defense as security and
privacy move to the forefront of business considerations. Section
B examines the current state of AI applied to cybersecurity
platforms, as well as the outlook for achieving greater autonomy
in these systems. Lastly, Section C provides a foundational
exploration of the technical aspects surrounding autonomous
network defense systems. As a lead into Part II, this exploration
will highlight aspects of AI-driven network defense relevant to
the respective privacy and automation provisions of the GDPR.
A. THE RISE OF INTELLIGENT NETWORK DEFENSE SYSTEMS:
ANTICIPATING AUTONOMOUS CYBERSECURITY
The proliferation of the internet has fostered an
interconnected world where malicious actors can transcend
physical and geographical barriers to cause harm. From
espionage to offensive cyber operations, intellectual property
theft to compromises of private information, cyberspace has
precipitated a new domain to pursue traditional forms of
conflict. Cyberspace has been defined by the evolution of
technology, but its novelty in relation to conventional conflict is
born from its applicability as a new venue for opportunity and
disruption.26 For governments, cyberspace is a domain void of
geographical barriers; yet one which they are compelled to
defend.27 For corporations, security in cyberspace has become a
foundational business consideration in a time when data
breaches can have insurmountable consequences.
The cyber threat landscape has rapidly evolved as
technology and data expand across interconnected domains of
nation state activity, commerce, and public use.28 Cyberspace is
inherently blurred by rapidly evolving technologies, a broad
range of actors, and the absence of an institutional hierarchy. As
such, the digital world has precipitated a paradigm of new
vectors for opportunity and harm. Innate to the underlying
advancements in technology and increased global connectivity is

26. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 35 (discussing the
international cooperation and governance implications of AI).
27. Id at 3.
28. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE COST OF MALICIOUS CYBER
ACTIVITY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 4 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/The-Cost-of-Malicious-Cyber-Activity-to-the-U.S.
-Economy.pdf (explaining the landscape of threats posed by “malicious cyber
activity”).
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the amplified threat to information technology systems. This
hand-in-hand relationship is the fundamental quagmire of
society’s dependence on technology—advancements in
information automation simultaneously offer ways to improve
people’s lives through technological means while augmenting
the avenues by which we can be harmed through our use of the
same technology.29 Cybersecurity is no exception and world
leaders, lawmakers, and corporate executives have taken notice.
Nation states utilize the digitally connected world to pursue
traditional forms of conflict in a new medium.30 Meanwhile,
corporations are routinely faced with novel threats from state
and non-state actors seeking to leverage cyberspace for criminal
gain and other nefarious purposes. As many have noted,
cybersecurity is now a “C-suite” issue that has the potential to
disrupt business operations and undermine the integrity of an
organization.31 To appreciate the cyber threat one must look no
further than recent news headlines.32 Data breaches, theft of
trade secrets, and targeted cyberattacks have in recent years
plagued corporations and governments across the globe.
Cyberattacks can disrupt critical infrastructure, undermine
financial markets and institutions, and threaten national
security.33 The ramifications of these threats extend well beyond
a disruption of business operations to include liability,
regulatory penalties, loss of strategic information, and
reputational damage.34 Moreover, the externalities of

29. E.g., NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 39 (“AI can be a major
driver of economic growth and social progress . . . with thoughtful attention to
its potential and to managing its risks.”).
30. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 28 at 3 (describing
malicious cyber activity carried out by nation-states against other nationstates).
31. See Greene, supra note 10 (describing the increased focus on cyber risk
management by corporate executive boards).
32. See, e.g. Alyza Sebenius & William Turton, U.S. Officials Brace for
Cyber-Attack Retaliation from Iran, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-03/u-s-officials-brace-for
-cyber-attack-retaliation-from-iran (reporting on the potential for Iranian
cyber-attacks in response to U.S airstrikes on Iran).
33. Nadine Wirkuttis & Hadas Klein, Artificial Intelligence in
Cybersecurity, 1 CYBER, INTELLIGENCE, & SECURITY 103, 104 (2017) (explaining
three primary motivations underlying cyber threats: “financial, political, or
military reasons”).
34. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 28 at 33 (“The total cost
of malicious cyber activity directed at U.S. entities is difficult to estimate
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cyberattacks can have cascading effects on broader communities
of users, business partners, industries, and governments.
The scope of harm posed by malicious cyber activity is
immense and pervasive across a spectrum of institutions.
Moving forward, the problem is only likely to worsen with the
rise of big data, the proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT),
and the prominence of automation in nearly all aspects of
society.35 The challenge for corporate and governmental
organizations is keeping up with evolving threats when
resources and talent are increasingly strained. From a workforce
perspective, there is simply not enough talent to go around.
According to the 2017 Global Information Security Workforce
Study released by the Center for Cyber Safety and Education,
there will be a cybersecurity workforce shortage of 1.8 million by
2022.36 Meanwhile, companies are increasingly subject to
regulatory fines and liabilities as governments pass data privacy
and breach notification laws.37 Cybersecurity has no doubt
moved to the forefront of business considerations as institutions
increasingly see the need to be more vigilant in safeguarding
data and responding to threats. However, acknowledging the
problem is only part of finding a solution, and limited means in
an expanding threat landscape are likely to challenge
cybersecurity in the years to come.38 In an effort to confront the
cybersecurity challenge, institutions and security experts are
because . . . many data breaches go undetected, and even when they are
detected, they are mostly unreported, or the final cost is unknown.”).
35. See Remesh Ramachandran, How Artificial Intelligence Is Changing
Cyber Security Landscape and Preventing Cyber Attacks, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept.
14, 2019), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/339509 (stating that the
efficiency and low cost of the rise of AI can be used both for cybersecurity and
for cost-effective attacks).
36. See (ISC)2, Comment to NIST RFI – Strengthening the Cybersecurity
of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure: Workforce Development
(2017)
https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2017/08/02/isc2.pdf
(describing the current metrics of the cybersecurity workforce and anticipated
challenges).
37. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), all
50 U.S. states have enacted data breach notification laws. See Security Breach
Notification Laws,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS.
(Sept.
9,
2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information
-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (providing a table of the
corresponding breach notification statute for each state).
38. See Wirkuttis & Klein, supra note 33, at 115 (explaining that AI’s
advances still cannot fully accommodate the rapidly changing cybersecurity
environment).
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turning towards AI technologies and machine learning processes
to alter the economics of cybersecurity.39
B. AN OVERVIEW OF AI, MACHINE LEARNING, AND
CYBERSECURITY
In the context of cybersecurity, AI technologies can
encompass a spectrum of utility ranging from automated
detection to adaptive, autonomous systems capable of sharing
information and acting independently of human control to
protect a network or information system. While the former exists
in some of today’s cybersecurity systems, the latter is more akin
to an ambition—feasible in the coming years only if AI
technologies achieve greater autonomy.40 To appreciate AI in the
context of cybersecurity, however, it is important to first
understand AI technologies as a whole. AI can be broadly viewed
as a computerized system that can rationally solve complex
problems or act appropriately to achieve an objective.41 Across
applications of AI, experts have more narrowly defined the scope
of AI based on taxonomies that reflect the function, capabilities,
or problem space of a system.42 For example, venture capitalist
Frank Chen categorizes the problem space of AI into five general
groups: “logical reasoning, knowledge representation, planning
and navigation, natural language processing, and perception.”43
39. Raghav Bharadwaj, Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity – Current
Use-Cases and Capabilities, EMERJ (July 22, 2019), https://emerj.com/ai-sectoroverviews/artificial-intelligence-cybersecurity/ (surveying current and potential
business uses for AI in cybersecurity).
40. See Bert Rankin, AI in Cybersecurity: What Is Hype and What Is Real?,
LASTLINE (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.lastline.com/blog/ai-technology-in
-cybersecurity-what-is-hype-and-what-is-real/
(discussing
the
current
limitations and future expectations of AI as applied to the cybersecurity field).
See also The Value of Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity, PONEMON INST.
(July 2018) at 10, https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/EX0P6YPO (finding that
human intervention is still required when dealing with alerts).
41. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3 at 6-7 (offering
alternative definitions of AI concepts and suggesting a problem-solution
taxonomy for defining AI).
42. See id. at 6 (citing STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH (2d ed. 2009)) (discussing AIs as “systems
that think like humans . . . systems that act like humans . . . systems that think
rationally . . . [and] systems that act rationally” and explaining the differences
between each).
43. Id. at 7 (citing Frank Chen, AI, Deep Learning, and Machine Learning:
A
Primer,
ANDREESSEN
HOROWITZ
(June
10,
2016),
http://a16z.com/2016/06/10/ai-deep-learning-machines).
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AI is inherently difficult to define because the application of
AI technologies often flows between routine data processing by
algorithmic systems and more advanced AI processes that
require intelligent computer operations. It is common for a
problem to be initially viewed as requiring AI to be solved when
the solution ultimately requires only routine data processing.44
Further clarification can be found by looking at how AI is used.
From self-driving vehicles to diagnosing disease, AI is a
burgeoning tool that, year by year, takes hold in new industries
and markets. Meanwhile, on a more intimate level, our daily
interaction with AI-driven products like smart speakers and
facial recognition tools are inconspicuously and rapidly altering
the human relationship with technology. These forms of AI,
commonly referred to as Narrow AI,45 have already proliferated
across society and enhanced how we use technology for common
tasks. Meanwhile, the future of AI technologies lies in General
AI—systems capable of demonstrating intelligent behavior to
process cognitive tasks.46 While Narrow AI enables machines to
complete a defined task in a manner beyond that of which a
human can do, General AI has the potential to surpass human
performance in nearly every cognitive process.47 In the context
of cybersecurity, a General AI system would be that which
employs predictive and adaptive information security or
network defense techniques to communicate between systems
and act independent of human control.
At its core, AI can be viewed as the pursuit of applications
that can systemically produce intelligent behavior.48 However,

44. Id. (“In some cases, opinion may shift, meaning that a problem is
considered as requiring AI before it has been solved, but once a solution is well
known it is considered routing data processing.”).
45. Narrow AI is “narrow” in that a new system must be developed for each
new application. See id. at 7 n.12 (“Narrow AI is not a single technical approach,
but rather a set of discrete problems whose solutions rely on a toolkit of AI
methods along with some problem-specific algorithms.”).
46. Id. at 7 (“General AI . . . refers to a notional future AI system that
exhibits apparently intelligent behavior at least as advanced as a person across
the full range of cognitive tasks.”) (emphasis in original).
47. See Tegmark, supra note 3 (“While narrow AI may outperform humans
at whatever its specific task is, like playing chess or solving equations, AGI
would outperform humans at nearly every cognitive task.”).
48. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 7 (“Although the
boundaries of AI can be uncertain and have tended to shift over time, what is
important is that a core objective of AI research and applications over the years
has been to automate or replicate intelligent behavior.”).
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the breadth and application of AI is vast, and there are no
universal definitions for AI and the subsets of AI-related
technologies and processes.49 It is important to recognize how
ambiguously defined AI impacts the development and
proliferation of the technology. This is immediately apparent
when looking at the short-term limitations and long-term
prospects of AI in cybersecurity. Vendors are increasingly
advertising AI-driven cybersecurity solutions capable of
detecting threats and responding to intrusions even before they
develop into a full breach.50 However, many experts believe that
this advertising is misleading.51 While these systems do employ
AI-based techniques to detect malware and recognize anomalous
patterns, the systems still fall under the category of Narrow AI
and likely fall short of touted expectations.52 This concept
becomes more apparent when looking at the intrusion detection
systems commonly used today.
Intrusion detection systems monitor a network or system
looking for malicious activity that violates a defined rule. They
are typically either network or host-based;53 however, they can
also be characterized by how they detect malicious activity. Such
methods generally fall into two categories: signature-based
detection that identifies defined sequences within strings of
data,54 or anomaly-based detection that looks for patterns
outside of defined baselines.55 Anomaly-based detection often
relies on machine learning, a subset of AI that uses algorithms
to statistically evaluate large amounts of data to repeatedly
refine its decision-making process and outcomes.56 While these
systems are more capable of “learning” and recognizing patterns

49. See id. at 6–7.
50. See generally, Lily H. Newman, AI Can Help Cybersecurity – If It Can
Fight
Through
the
Hype,
WIRED
(Apr.
29,
2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/ai-machine-learning-cybersecurity/
(criticizing
machine learning cybersecurity solutions that are advertised as “AI Driven”).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Christopher Day, Intrusion and Prevention Detection Systems,
in COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SECURITY HANDBOOK 63–66 (2009)
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of host-based and network-based
intrusion detection systems).
54. Id.
55. See Wirkuttis & Klein, supra note 33, at 107 (describing the two main
principles for intrusion detection prevention systems (IDPS)).
56. See generally Newman, supra note 50.
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to keep up with evolving cyberattacks, they are still primarily
detection systems that require human programming and
control.57 In a sense, the application of machine learning
techniques to network defense systems can be viewed as an
extension of rules-based systems. This can be thought of as
automated processes designed to make cybersecurity threat
detection and mitigation efforts more efficient and effective
while still requiring a degree of human control. Although they
utilize advanced machine learning techniques, they are a far cry
from General AI.
Deep learning—using neural network models to mimic
human thinking—is a subset of machine learning. Nidhi
Chappel, the Director of Machine Learning at Intel, described
this technique as “machines learning on their own without
explicit programming.”58 She analogized this process to how a
child learns societal norms by observing the world without
having to be explicitly told the rules.59 For cybersecurity, deep
learning is another step towards truly autonomous network
defense and has already demonstrated some utility.60 For
example, deep learning approaches have enhanced malware
identification and have thereby reduced false positives and
negatives.61 It is important to note, however, that even systems
trained using deep learning are only preventive to an extent.62
They are still primarily driven by a detect-and-respond model
that is less conducive to an evolving threat landscape.63 Moving
forward, experts believe that AI will have a significant impact

57. See id.
58. Deb M. Landau, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning: How
Computers Learn, IQ (Aug. 17, 2016) (quoting Nidhi Chappel).
59. Id.
60. See Raffael Marty, AI in Cybersecurity: Where We Stand & Where We
Need
to
Go,
DARKREADING
(Jan.
11,
2018),
https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/ai-in-cybersecurity-where
-we-stand-and-where-we-need-to-go/a/d-id/1330787 (“Today’s approaches in
malware identification have greatly benefited from deep learning, which has
helped drop false positive rates to very low numbers while reducing the false
negative rates at the same time.”).
61. Id.
62. See id. (explaining that unsupervised machine learning is still not ideal
for locating anomalies, and, while supervised machine learning has been more
effective for malware, it lacks good data sets for most other areas, preventing
the training of algorithms).
63. Id.
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on cybersecurity.64 These technologies are expected to offer a
more preventive solution that can classify cyber threats in realtime and detect never-before-seen activity, such as zero-day
exploits.65 Experts anticipate these systems will eventually be
capable of taking action with little human input or even without
intervention from a network operator.66
The current state of autonomous cybersecurity systems is
blurred by a fog of promises from cybersecurity vendors.67 Many
companies advertise systems that use AI technologies capable of
preventing attacks.68 However, experts have suggested that
these guarantees are more marketing than technique.69 Many of
the products still employ learning approaches that require
human operators to tag data used to train algorithms. While
security companies are deploying systems that employ machine
learning approaches, fully autonomous network defense systems
are still more of a dream than a reality.70 Embellished promises
and a lack of understanding of how these systems can easily
cloud the state of AI in the cybersecurity industry.
Notwithstanding, the likelihood of greater autonomy in
cybersecurity systems seems encouraging. Researchers continue
to push the bounds of AI to reduce the blind spots associated

64. See generally Game Changers: Artificial Intelligence Part III, Artificial
Intelligence and Public Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Info. Tech. of
the H. Oversight Comm., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Ben Buchanan,
Postdoctoral Fellow, Belfer Center Cybersecurity Project, Harvard University),
Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record of Ben Buchanan,
Postdoctoral Fellow, Belfer Center Cybersecurity Project, Harvard University,
House Oversight Committee, Subcommittee on IT (Apr. 6, 2018).
65. See generally Laurent Gil, The Debate Is Over: Artificial Intelligence Is
the Future of Cybersecurity, THE CYBERSECURITY SOURCE (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.scmagazine.com/home/opinions/blogs/executive-insight/the
-debate-is-over-artificial-intelligence-is-the-future-for-cybersecurity/
(explaining why AI is the only viable option for future cybersecurity systems).
66. Id.
67. See Newman, supra note 50 (“Machine learning’s biggest strength in
security is training to understand what is ‘baseline’ or ‘normal’ for a system,
and then flagging anything unusual for human review.”).
68. Id.
69. See generally id.
70. See Scott Finnie, AI in Cybersecurity: What Works and What Doesn’t,
CSO
ONLINE
(Aug.
15,
2018),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3295596/security/ai-in-cybersecurity-whatworks-and-what-doesnt.html (“Much of what we hear about artificial
intelligence and machine learning in security products is steeped in marketing,
making it hard to know what these tools actually do.”).
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with traditional network defense systems. As AI technologies
and deep learning techniques proliferate, it is likely that AIbased systems will require less and less human interaction.
In the cybersecurity domain, the capacity to detect and
respond to intrusions is dependent on the ability to collect,
process and analyze data. AI-based cybersecurity systems
enhance this process through a combination of automation and
advanced algorithms. The success of these systems is dependent
on the availability of large quantities of quality data.71
Traditionally, vast amounts of data have made it difficult for
network defenders to distinguish relevant data and make
connections across data sets. In contrast, machine learning
thrives off data and offers significant advantages in this
regard.72 More data allows AI-based cybersecurity systems to
establish a baseline of normal network activity or system
behavior. Using an anomaly detection approach, these systems
can then better detect changes or abnormalities in the
network.73 Alternatively, these systems can use large amounts
of data to employ a misuse detection approach that identifies
malicious activity by defining patterns of abnormal behavior in
the network or system.74
In its current state, AI-based cybersecurity systems still
require some level of human intervention. While today’s systems
make the threat detection process more efficient and empower
security analysts to make connections in a dynamic threat
environment, human decision-making is a requirement
nonetheless.75 Notwithstanding, advancements in deep learning
and artificial neural networks show promise in achieving greater
autonomy in the cybersecurity domain. Beyond improvements in
the underlying algorithms, progress in the field of AI-based
cybersecurity will be dependent on the availability of data sets.
As such, it is likely that data privacy will weigh heavily in the

71. See Marty, supra note 60 (arguing that machine learning requires large
amounts of training data to be practically employed as a cybersecurity solution).
72. See id.
73. See Wirkuttis & Klein, supra note 33, at 107 (describing the misuse
detection approach and the anomaly detection approach associated with
intrusion detection prevention systems).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 114 (noting that expert systems have only progressed to the point
of assisting decision makers and do not substitute for them).
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development, proliferation, and overall utility of AI-based
cybersecurity systems.
C. A TECHNICAL PRIMER ON MACHINE LEARNING AND
CYBERSECURITY: WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE, WHERE IT IS GOING, AND
ITS RELATION TO DATA PRIVACY
Cybersecurity is premised on identifying malicious activity
within a host, system, or network.76 This inherently requires
network defenders to differentiate between permissible activity
and malicious behavior, a nuanced task that can prove
challenging when malicious intent is rarely apparent.77 Often
the distinguishing element is simply context.78 Whether it is
downloading a malicious file or copying permitted software,
network traffic often looks the same.79 Put another way, the only
difference between permitted network activity and malicious
behavior is often the context of data flow. Machine learning
seeks to address this challenge by leveraging large amounts of
data to establish a baseline (i.e. what is “normal”), distinguish
anomalies, and attribute such deviations to malicious network
behavior.80 There are two primary approaches to machine
learning: supervised and unsupervised learning.81 Supervised
machine learning relies on large sets of labeled data to train
algorithms as to what is “good” or “bad.”82 This approach has
demonstrated significant utility for combating malware and
spam because of the availability of large sets of labeled
samples.83 However, in scenarios where good data sets are
limited, such as detecting network attacks, supervised machine
learning would prove less useful because there is insufficient

76. See generally Marty, supra note 60.
77. See id. (stating that the primary task of machine learning is to “find
anomalies” and acknowledging the difficulties of this form of threat detection
with limited training data).
78. Id. (explaining that context alleviates challenges in identifying
anomalies with machine learning).
79. See id. (“For example, can you define what is normal behavior for your
laptop day in, day out? Don’t forget to think of that new application you
downloaded recently. How do you differentiate that from a download triggered
by an attacker?”).
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (“The two poster use cases [for success in machine learning] are
malware identification and spam detection.”).
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data to establish a baseline for anomaly detection.84
Unsupervised learning is another approach used to train
algorithms. This entails various techniques, such as
dimensionality reduction, clustering, and association rule
learning, designed to make data easier to analyze and
understand.85 While these techniques are beyond the scope of
this paper, they can best be thought of as ways to find or describe
hidden structures in data.86
Two principal considerations in the context of machine
learning, cybersecurity, and data privacy are the types of data
relevant to AI-based network defense systems and how that data
is used. The first consideration can be broad and is often heavily
dependent on the nature of the cyber threat in question.
Examples of relevant data points are IP addresses, domain
names, host names, port numbers, file names, registry data,
commands, usernames, email addresses, and hashes. All of this
information can be broadly classified as threat indicators. The
second consideration, how data is used, also significantly
depends on the nature of the cyber threat. For the purposes of
this paper, how data is used is best viewed in the context of cyber
threat intelligence and how it is leveraged to protect networks
and systems. Cyber threat intelligence is threat data that has
been collected, evaluated, and analyzed by experts using
structured tradecraft.87 It is fueled by an intelligence cycle that
leverages advanced toolsets and human expertise to identify and
attribute cyber threats.
A significant piece of this process is information sharing
that leverages the collective knowledge, experience, and
capabilities of whole communities to better understand cyber
threats.88 There are sector-specific Information Sharing and

84. Id. (describing limitations to supervised machine learning).
85. Id. (discussing different applications for unsupervised machine
learning).
86. See id.
87. See Intel & Analysis Working Group, What Is Cyber Threat
Intelligence?,
CENTER
FOR
INTERNET
SECURITY
(n.d.),
https://
www.cisecurity.org/blog/what-is-cyber-threat-intelligence/.
(“Cyber
threat
intelligence is what cyber threat information becomes once it has been collected,
evaluated in the context of its source and reliability, and analyzed through
rigorous and structured tradecraft techniques by those with substantive
expertise and access to all-source information.”).
88. See NIST, SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-150, GUIDE TO CYBER THREAT
INFORMATION
SHARING
at
iii
(2016),
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Analysis Centers (ISACs) and private entities within the United
States and internationally that implement similar sharing
programs.89 For example, the Financial Services Information
Sharing and Analysis Center is the central resource for cyber
and physical threat intelligence analysis and sharing amongst
the global financial industry.90 In addition to specific indicators,
ISACs often share tactics, techniques, and procedures, security
alerts, threat intelligence reports, and tool configurations.91
Such sharing no doubt enhances cybersecurity across the globe;
however, it can be a double-edged sword when data privacy is
taken into account.92
A key challenge for sharing threat information is protecting
against unauthorized disclosure of personal data.93 This has
prompted ISACs and similar entities to employ detailed sharing
policies and procedures to safeguard privacy in the digital
world.94 Today, the sharing process is highlighted by extensive
human control.95 Indicators are vetted and threat information is
stripped of personal data before being disseminated to larger
groups.96 However, this process will likely change as AI-driven
systems increasingly replace human judgment to make
determinations and share information. This paradigm may be
especially challenging when considered in the context of the
black box problem—the idea that an advanced system can
produce a result without any evidence as to how it arrived at its
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-150.pdf (“By
exchanging cyber threat information within a sharing community,
organizations can leverage the collective knowledge, experience, and
capabilities of that sharing community to gain more complete understanding of
the threats the organization may face.”).
89. See, e.g., FINANCIAL SERVICES INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS
CENTER (FSISAC), https://www.fsisac.com/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
90. See generally id.
91. See NIST 800-150, supra note 88, at ii (“Cyber threat information
includes indicators of compromise; tactics, techniques, and procedures used by
threat actors; suggested actions to detect, contain, or prevent attacks; and the
findings from the analyses of incidents.”).
92. See id. at 4–5 (highlighting concerns relating to safeguarding personal
information and trade secrets when exchanging information on cyber threats).
93. See id. at 4 (listing the “[d]isclosure of sensitive information, such
as . . . personally identifiable information” as one of the challenges of
information sharing).
94. See id. (providing guidelines for establishing and participating in
sharing relationships).
95. See, e.g., id. (outlining regulations for information sharing).
96. See id. at 11.
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decision.97 The effectiveness of tomorrow’s cybersecurity
systems could very well depend on the availability and sharing
of information that may directly or indirectly involve personal
data. Moving forward, this could pose significant challenges for
engineers and lawmakers as society seeks to balance
cybersecurity needs and data privacy concerns.
II. THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION:
AUTONOMOUS CYBERSECURITY AND DATA PRIVACY
The proliferation of technologies across nearly all domains
is altering the foundation of civilization. Never before in the
history of humankind have societies been more connected, as
emerging technologies foster unparalleled ways to for us to
communicate our identity to the world—intentionally or
unintentionally. In the wake of society’s technological growth,
we are now faced with the challenges of our technological
supremacy, and data privacy is taking center stage.98 Society
continues to immerse itself in computerized machinery
prompting each individual to leave a digital footprint99 that is
often more revealing of a person’s being than any other form of
communication. While there are benefits and conveniences to
projecting one’s digital self to the world, it can also be fraught
with uncertainty, lack of control, and abusive practices that
threaten the very utility of the underlying technologies.100 This
has prompted lawmakers to direct significant attention to data
privacy, and Europe has taken the lead.

97. See Brandon Buckner, How Can We Trust Decisions Made by AI?,
Leidos: Insights (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.leidos.com/insights/how-can-we
-trust-decisions-made-ai (stating that decisions made by AI and machine
learning techniques are often made in a “black box” and that tracing a point
back to its origin is not yet a part of AI and machine learning).
98. See, e.g., Paul Smits, Legal Specialist: New Technology Forces Update
of Data Privacy Laws, INNOVATION ORIGINS (Feb. 9, 2020),
https://innovationorigins.com/legal-specialist-new-technology-forces-update-ofdata-privacy-laws/ (interviewing legal privacy expert, Jeroen Terstegge, who
believes the emergence of new technologies prompts an update in the General
Data Protection Regulation).
99. See
Digital
Footprint,
TECHTERMS,
https://
techterms.com/definition/digital_footprint (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (defining
“digital footprint” as “a trail of data you create while using the Internet”).
100. See, e.g., id. (“[O]nce digital data has been shared online, there is no
guarantee you will ever be able to remove it from the Internet.”).
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Part II of this paper explores the GDPR101 as it relates to AIbased network defense systems. It offers two key findings: first,
compliance under the GDPR may be challenging but still
possible for today’s AI-based cybersecurity systems, and second,
absent a technological solution, it will become increasingly
difficult for these systems to maintain GDPR compliance as the
underlying AI technologies achieve greater autonomy. Section A
examines how the GDPR applies to AI and network defense and
discusses the compliance challenges posed by this regulation.
Section B examines the larger challenges of GDPR compliance
associated with training algorithms and information sharing.
Section C looks at the future of AI-based network defense and
how these challenges will be compounded as AI-based network
defense systems move towards greater autonomy and may be
less capable of protecting personal data. Lastly, Section D
highlights the growing consensus within the US for a national
data privacy law and identifies key features that may minimize
data privacy issues in cybersecurity and promote the overall
development of autonomous network defense systems.
A. THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION APPLIED TO
AI-BASED NETWORK DEFENSE: LEGAL QUESTIONS AND
CHALLENGES
In 2016, the European Union (EU) Parliament passed the
most significant data privacy regulation in decades. The GDPR,
which took effect on May 25, 2018, provides EU citizens with
extensive data privacy and protection rights that are designed
to protect102 European citizens and harmonize data privacy laws
across Europe.103 However, the regulation extends beyond the
EU to reach European citizens worldwide and businesses
outside of Europe that handle the personal data of EU
citizens.104 On its face, the GDPR does not seem to be a
regulation that would govern cybersecurity and network
defense. Rather, data privacy suggests protecting personal data

101. See generally, GDPR.
102. See GDPR, pmbl. (1) (declaring protection of personal data a
fundamental right).
103. See David Bender, GDPR Harmonization: Reality or Myth?, IAPP (June
7, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-harmonization-reality-or-myth/.
104. See generally Chakravorti, supra note 15 (explaining that the global
nature of information technology has the effect of imposing Europe’s GDPR
Rules on the rest of the world).
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used for things like social media or financial transactions. But if
one looks deeper, the connection between personal data and
cybersecurity is more apparent. In the context of AI-based
network defense, the association with data processing is
primarily derived from two separate components of the
automated threat intelligence life cycle: personal data used to
train a network defense algorithm and personal data used in the
cyber threat intelligence sharing process.105
1. The GDPR: Scope
The GDPR applies to the “processing of personal data” by a
“controller” or “processor” regardless of whether the processing
takes place in the EU.106 The GDPR also applies to the
processing of the personal data, of data subjects who are in the
EU, by a “controller” or “processor” outside of the EU, when the
processing relates to the offering of goods or services to EU
citizens or the monitoring of EU citizens’ behavior that takes
place in the EU.107 To fully unpack the scope of the GDPR and
understand the extent of this regulation, one must look at how
the regulation defines “personal data” and “processing,” as these
terms collectively expand the material scope of the GDPR:108
Personal Data means any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular
by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number,
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to
the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity of that natural person;109
Processing means any operation or set of operations which is
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not
by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation,
structuring, storage, adaption, or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making

105. See supra Section I part C (discussing the ways that A.I. uses data in
network defense).
106. GDPR, art. 3(1).
107. Id. at art. 3(2)(a)–(b).
108. Matthew Humerick, Taking AI Personally: How the E.U. Must Learn to
Balance the Interests of Personal Data Privacy & Artificial Intelligence, 34
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 393, 402 (2018) (suggesting that definitions of
“personal data” and “processing” serve to expand the material scope of the
GDPR).
109. GDPR, art. 4(1).
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available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction
. . . .110

AI-based network defense systems primarily fall within the
scope of the GDPR through either the use of personal data to
train algorithms or when personal data is used in the cyber
threat intelligence sharing process. Both scenarios raise
questions of whether an entity can be considered a “controller”
or “processor,” and whether certain indicators are considered
personal data. As noted above, a “controller” is an entity that
determines the purposes and means of the processing of data, 111
and a “processor” is an entity that processes personal data on
behalf of a controller.112 In network defense and the cyber threat
information life cycle, this encompasses any entity that collects
and stores data, shares information, or uses data for machine
learning. This could include developers, security vendors,
ISACs, or entities that have employed a particular AI-based
network defense system because these entities are all involved
in operations performed on personal data. In many cases an
entity could be considered both a “controller” and a “processor”
depending on the operational data role.113
The next question is whether the relevant data is even
considered personal data. As discussed above, network defense
is fueled by known indicators, and these indicators often include
personal data. Some indicators, such as email addresses,
usernames, or payment transactions, are more obviously
associated with personal data.114 These types of indicators can
be used, directly or indirectly, to identify a natural person. In
other circumstances, whether an indicator constitutes personal
data is less apparent and often depends on how it is used. One
of the most common cyber threat indicators is an internet
protocol (IP) address, and European courts have found that IP
addresses are protected personal data because they allow users

110. Id. at art. 4(2).
111. Id. at art. 4(7).
112. Id. at art. 4(8).
113. For example, a cybersecurity vendor could be considered a controller
when it is processing data it collects and aggregates from various sources but
also be considered a processor when it is only processing data on behalf of a
particular client.
114. See, e.g., What Is Personal Data?, EU GDPR COMPLIANT (last visited
Feb. 9, 2020) (listing full names, email addresses, and credit card numbers as
examples of classical personal data), https://eugdprcompliant.com/personal
-data/.
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to be precisely identified.115 Even dynamic IP addresses, those
which are temporarily assigned to a computing device, can be
considered personal data when a controller has legal means to
identify a data subject in conjunction with additional data that
may be available.116 Under this principle, indicators could
individually fall out of the scope of personal data. However,
when means exist to augment data with other information to
identify a data subject, the initial indicator could then be viewed
as personal data. For example, a user’s search queries may only
become personal data when a processor has access to IP records
associated with the data subject that could then identify the
natural person.117
2. The GDPR: Key Features and Principles
The GDPR consists of ninety-nine articles that collectively
aim to regulate data processing and provide a uniform approach
to data privacy.118 At its core, however, are specific principles set
forth in Article 5.119 These key principles relating to the
processing of personal data include lawfulness, fairness, and
transparency; purpose limitation; data minimization; accuracy;
storage limitation; integrity and confidentiality; and
accountability.120 For those developing or using AI systems that
utilize data from EU citizens, the GDPR can be an unavoidable
force. In the age of big data and automation, the extraterritorial
nature of the regulation can easily bring non-EU corporations
within EU jurisdiction.121 Moreover, subjected entities can face
administrative fines up to 20,000,000 EUR or up to four percent
of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial

115. See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs,
Compositeurs et Èditeurs, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, para. 26. (describing IP
addresses as personal data).
116. See Case C-582/14, Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, para. 49 (holding that dynamic IP addresses are personal
data within the meaning of former GDPR Article 2(a) under such
circumstances).
117. See, e.g., id. (holding that a dynamic IP address can constitute personal
data if an online services provider possesses the ability to identify the subject
using the IP address in conjunction with other information).
118. See generally GDPR.
119. See GDPR, art. 5(1)(a)–(f).
120. Id.
121. See GDPR, art. 3 (establishing the extraterritorial scope of the GDPR).
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year.122 The collective utility of the GDPR is up for debate. On
one hand, it can be argued that the law is about protecting
citizens by setting forth requirements and standards for data
processing and information sharing.123 On the other, the GDPR
can be viewed as a regulation with geopolitical intentions meant
to strengthen Europe’s political power in the digital age.124
Regardless of its purpose, the GDPR cannot be ignored, and
there are several key provisions relevant to AI, cybersecurity,
and information sharing. These include provisions related to the
right to consent, the right to be forgotten, the right to an
explanation, and the right to data portability.
A key feature of the GDPR is consent. Article 4(1) requires
that consent be “freely given, specific, informed, and
unambiguous.”125 Furthermore, the GDPR adopts an opt-in
approach to consent that requires controllers to be able to
demonstrate that the data subject has consented,126 and such
consent can be withdrawn at any time.127 Data subjects can also
restrict processing of personal data under certain
circumstances.128 These include instances where a data subject
contests the accuracy of personal data, the data subject believes
the processing is unlawful but data erasure is not a suitable
remedy, the controller no longer needs the personal data but
must maintain it for legal claims of the data subject, or when the
data subject has objected to processing based on legitimate
grounds.129 For machine learning, these consent requirements

122. GDPR, art. 83.
123. See GDPR, art. 1(1) (“This Regulation lays down rules relating to the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
rules relating to the free movement of personal data.”).
124. See Roslyn Layton & Julian Mclendon, The GDPR: What It Really Does
and How the U.S. Can Chart a Better Course, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 234,
236 (2018) (suggesting that the primary goals of the GDPR are geopolitical,
including “(1) solidifying legitimacy for Brussels during a period of skepticism
among voters, and (2) strengthening European political power against the real
or perceived threat of American digital prowess”).
125. GDPR, art. 4(11).
126. See GDPR, art. 7(1) (“Where processing is based on consent, the
controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to
processing of his or her personal data.”).
127. See GDPR, art. 7(3) (“The data subject shall have the right to withdraw
his or her consent at any time.”).
128. See GDPR, art. 18 (“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from
the controller restriction of processing where one of the following applies . . . .”).
129. See id.
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can prove challenging because it can limit the amount of data
initially available and can impact the training model when data
is subsequently removed.130 Prior learning may be valid, but
derivative
learning
processes
could
risk
GDPR
noncompliance.131 Moving forward, these technical realities are
likely to challenge engineers and legal experts seeking to
promote compliant processes.
Another key feature of the GDPR relates to erasing data—
the “right to be forgotten.”132 Under Article 17, controllers are
obligated to erase all personal data under certain conditions.133
Instances that warrant erasure of data include when the data is
no longer necessary in relation to the purpose for which it was
collected and when consent has been withdrawn.134 Similar to
the consent issue, this can create significant challenges for AI.
The utility of algorithms trained on machine learning processes
stems from the training data.135 If data is subsequently removed,
this can disrupt the algorithm’s future behavior and create
inaccurate or unreliable results.136 Although companies could
train algorithms on updated datasets, this may create additional
risk and liabilities given the volatility and uncertainty if
significant portions of training data can be so easily removed. 137
In the context of cybersecurity, this could prove disastrous. For
example, if a large dataset of IP addresses was removed from a
training model, then the baseline for the network defense system
may be altered and no longer be reliable in detecting
anomalies.138 Also, in some instances the technical realities of
isolating and deleting data may make compliance overly
burdensome. Some commentators have even suggested that the

130. See Humerick, supra note 108, at 406 (“Both the need for consent and
the right [to] withdraw consent threaten the development of AI because it could
limit the amount of data available to learn from.”).
131. See id. (suggesting that when consent to use data is withdrawn “further
processing of and learning from these specific data points would constitute a
violation of the GDPR”).
132. GDPR, art. 17.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Humerick, supra note 108, at 408 (noting this impact that data
erasure may have on the accuracy and reliability of an AI system).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See supra Part I Section B (discussing how anomaly detection requires
processing of sufficient data sets).
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technical requirements of data deletion could make compliance
nearly impossible.139 Companies that are unable to isolate
indicators that fall under the GDPR would risk noncompliance
by continuing to operate their systems.
Another prominent component of the GDPR as it relates to
AI is the right to an explanation. Article 22 governs automated
individual decision-making,140 which is often a key feature of AI
systems.141 This article provides data subjects with the right to
not be subject to decisions based solely on automated processing,
including profiling, that produce a legal effect concerning the
data subject.142 While there are stated exceptions, such as public
interest or performance of a contract,143 uncertainty as to what
meets an exception should warrant reservations for those
looking to maintain compliance.144 Furthermore, the automated
processing provisions require that any subject decisions be
explainable.145 This can prove challenging, especially in the
context of unsupervised learning, when engineers cannot trace
the learning process or understand why the system made its

139. See generally Edward F. Villaronga, Peter Kieseberg, & Tiffany Li,
Humans Forget, Machines Remember: Artificial Intelligence and the Right to Be
Forgotten, 34 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV., 304 (2018) (discussing the difficulties
that arise in trying to erase data).
140. See GDPR, art. 22 (providing provisions relating to “[a]utomated
individual decision-making, including profiling”).
141. See Falchetta, supra note 5 (explaining that AI applications are used to
“automatically sort, score, categorize, assess and rank people”).
142. See GDPR, art. 22(1) (“The data subject shall have the right not to be
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling,
which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly
affects him or her.”).
143. See id. at art. 22(2), 46 (providing exceptions for when data subjects
may be able to be subject to a decision based solely on automatic processing that
produce a legal effect).
144. See Eduardo Ustaran & Victoria Hordern, Automated Decision-Making
Under the GDPR—A Right for Individuals or a Prohibition for Controllers,
HOGAN LOVELLS: CHRONICLE OF DATA PROTECTION (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.hldataprotection.com/2017/10/articles/international-eu
-privacy/automated-decision-making-under-the-gdpr-a-right-for-individualsor-a-prohibition-for-controllers/ (discussing the “considerable uncertainty” with
respect to Article 22 of the GDPR).
145. See GDPR, art. 22(3) (“[T]he data controller shall implement suitable
measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights . . . at least the right to obtain
human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of
view and to contest the decision.”).
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decision.146 As noted earlier, this is the black box problem.147 In
the context of cybersecurity and information sharing, this can be
a significant challenge when threat information is derived from
protected information and automatically shared with another
system or entity.
On its face, GDPR compliance for automated processing is
more akin to automated decisions that are closely aligned with
the rights of a natural person, such as access to health care or
criminal sentencing. However, automated decision processing
exists in the cyber world as well and can have significant
ramifications for users. This is especially true when
participation in society increasingly requires access to
information and the interconnected global domain. Imagine an
individual whose login credentials are revoked after an
automated system made a determination that revocation was
necessary to protect the network.148 As AI moves towards
greater autonomy and requires less human intervention, this is
a scenario that may become more likely.149 In this instance, it is
possible that network administrators would not be able to
explain why the system revoked access.150 Although loss of
access may not always be significant, the overarching issue is
likely to warrant concern for companies seeking to promote
compliant technology.151
A final prominent feature of the GDPR that is relevant to AI
is the right to data portability. Under Article 20, a data subject
has a right to receive personal data concerning him or her and
to transfer personal data from one controller to another.152 This
creates some of the same issues posed by to the rights to consent

146. See Buckner, supra note 97.
147. Supra Part I, Section C.
148. See, e.g., Lee Painter, Could AI Improve Identity Management and
Security,
CATAPULT
DIGITAL
(May
25,
2017),
https://www.digicatapult.org.uk/news-and-views/blog/could-ai-improve
-identity-management-and-security/ (describing the use of AI to determine if a
user should be able to access a network).
149. See generally Buckner, supra note 97.
150. Id.
151. See GDPR, art. 22(2), at 46 (indicating that the automated decisions
must be explicable).
152. GDPR, art. 20(1), at 45 (“[T]he data subject shall have the right to
receive the personal data concerning him or her . . . in a structured, commonly
used and machine-readable format . . . .”).
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and erasure,153 but it also creates practical challenges for the
cybersecurity industry. The utility of AI-based network defense
systems is derived from the underlying data sets and
algorithms.154 In most cases, users of these systems will have
consented to use of their information.155 In the event of a breach,
users may lose faith in a system and seek to take their business
elsewhere. Like other areas of the GDPR, this can create both
technical and legal problems that hinder the continued
development and implementation of AI-based network defense
systems. Moving forward, these challenges are only likely to be
compounded as AI technologies move towards greater autonomy.
B. TRAINING AI-BASED NETWORK DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND
AUTOMATED INFORMATION SHARING: TODAY’S COMPLIANCE AND
TOMORROW’S OUTLOOK
The GDPR aims to protect consumers by regulating the
processing of personal data.156 As described above, the
development and use of AI-based network defense systems
cannot escape the breadth of this regulation.157 On the front end,
the development of these systems requires data to foster the
machine learning process.158 Systems need personal data such
as usernames, IP addresses, and other cyber threat indicators to
train systems on normal behavior and empower systems to
identify malicious activity.159 Once these systems are in place,

153. See Humerick, supra note 108, at 409 (“[T]he right to portability poses
similar problems to those inherent in the rights to consent and erasure.”).
154. See Buckner, supra note 97 (“If an AI system is well constituted and
trained, has algorithms for prediction evaluation, and demonstrably produces
reasonably high quality, true positive results, then that model may be suited
for its purpose.”).
155. See Cybersecurity, AI, and Machine Learning: The Connection to GDPR,
TREND
MIRCO
(Apr.
26,
2018),
https://www.trendmicro.com/
vinfo/pl/security/news/security-technology/cybersecurity-ai-and-machinelearning-the-connection-to-gdpr (“Under GDPR, cybersecurity companies are
mandated to obtain explicit consent and explain to customers how their data
will be processed by security engines that use AI technology.”).
156. See GDPR, art. 1(1).
157. Supra Part II, Section A.
158. See, e.g., Artificial Intelligence for a Smarter Kind of Cybersecurity,
IBM, https://www.ibm.com/security/artificial-intelligence (last visited Feb. 9,
2020) (indicating that AI is trained by “consuming billions of data artifacts”).
159. Cf. Nathan McKinley, The Promise and Challenges of AI and Machine
Learning
for
Cybersecurity,
COP
MAGAZINE
(Nov.
28,
2019),
https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/the-promise-and-challenges-of-
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they still require continuous data to learn in a dynamic threat
environment.160 Moreover, the success of these systems moving
forward will be heavily dependent on the ability to act at cyber
speed.161 This can only be achieved when networks and systems
are constantly sharing information, and AI will likely be a
solution to this end.162 While this may be an ideal scenario for
cybersecurity, it also brings network defense further within the
scope of the GDPR.163 This section examines the larger
challenges of GDPR compliance associated with training
algorithms and information sharing. This leads into a broader
discussion in Section C regarding the dichotomy of autonomous
network defense and the challenges of cybersecurity as these
systems become more automated and capable of autonomous
action.
1. Training AI-Based Network Defense Systems
Good data drives good systems. Generally, AI systems that
train using machine learning processes require large quantities
of good data to produce successful results, and network defense
is no different. As discussed in Part I, AI-based network defense
is primarily driven by machine learning approaches that enable
intrusion detection through signature and anomaly-based
techniques.164 The breadth of relevant data can be vast. Network
activity, such as routing information and user activity, allows an
AI system to characterize network traffic and establish a more
effective baseline that can be used to identify potentially

ai-and-machine-learning-for-cybersecurity/ (explaining that “without relevant
datasets, you just cannot evaluate the security risks and threats at all”).
160. See id.
161. See id. (“Timely detection of the security threat or dangerous malware
is the key to gain a competitive and proactive lead in providing security
safeguards.”).
162. See, e.g., Derek Manky, AI and Machine Learning Will Have Significant
Impact on Cyber Security Strategies, INFO. MGMT. (Jan. 9, 2020, 3:30 AM),
https://www.information-management.com/opinion/ai-and-machine-learning
-will-have-significant-impact-on-cybersecurity-strategies
(proposing
that
future AI cybersecurity systems for will require vastly more sophisticated
information-sharing capabilities).
163. See Cybersecurity, AI, and Machine Learning: The Connection to
GDPR, supra note 155 (indicating that cybersecurity companies will need to
implement additional measures around collecting and processing personal data
to meet compliance requirements of the GDPR).
164. See Supra Part I.
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malicious deviations.165 Similarly, large quantities of malware
samples and other cyber threat intelligence information enables
these systems to identify external threats in a dynamic threat
environment.166 This collectively promotes a more effective
system capable of identifying and combatting malicious cyber
activity.
As discussed in Section A, the GDPR places significant
restrictions on how data is collected and used.167 In a sense, it
can be thought of as an availability problem. Will the GDPR
impose enough restrictions on the availability of good data to the
point where the development and implementation of these
systems may be unjustly stunted?168 At a minimum, this will
require entities that develop or implement AI-based
cybersecurity solutions to rethink approaches to collecting and
securing data. Like other areas of technology, this can prove
challenging when there is a gap in knowledge between
technology and the law.169 Moreover, transparency issues
associated with AI, such as the black box problem, may make
this an insurmountable task in some instances.170 It is not to say
that the requirements of the GDPR cannot be overcome, but it
will likely require extensive resources to maintain compliance.
From consent procedures to technical safeguards, developers
and users of AI-based network defense systems will be required
to reevaluate procedures and practices to comply with the data
165. See Mustafa Rassiwala, Network Traffic Analytics—Do We Need One
More
Network
Security
Category?,
LASTLINE
(Oct.
25,
2018),
https://www.lastline.com/blog/network-traffic-analytics-do-we-need-one-more
-network-security-category/ (explaining AI applications in the field of network
traffic analytics).
166. See Darek Manky, Threat Intelligence Lies at the Core of All Machine
Learning
and
AI,
FORTINET
(Oct.
8,
2019),
https://www.fortinet.com/blog/industry-trends/threat-intelligence-at-the-core
-ai-machine-learning.html (discussing the need for good threat intelligence in
order to detect today’s cybersecurity threats).
167. See supra Part II, Section A.
168. See Ahmed Baladi, Can GDPR Hinder AI Made in Europe,
CYBERSECURITY L. REP. (July 10, 2019) https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp
-content/uploads/2019/07/Baladi-Can-GDPR-Hinder-AI-Made-in-EuropeCybersecurity-Law-Report-10-07-19.pdf.
169. See, e.g., Gijs Leenders, The Regulation of Artificial Intelligence—A
Case Study of the Partnership on AI, MEDIUM (Apr. 13, 2019),
https://becominghuman.ai/the-regulation-of-artificial-intelligence-a-casestudy-of-the-partnership-on-ai-c1c22526c19f (arguing that regulators and the
law tend to lag behind technology and innovation).
170. See supra Part I, Section C.
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collection, consent, automation, and explanation requirements
of the GDPR.171 In practice, only time will tell how significant
the impact of the GDPR on the development of network defense
systems that use AI technologies may be. Notwithstanding,
there are some foreseeable consequences in this regard.
First, it is likely that the GDPR will favor larger entities
that have the resources to navigate compliance and employ
cutting-edge technologies. From legal expertise to the use of
advanced systems, large companies will be in the best position
to implement safeguards to ensure compliance. Second, smaller
companies may be most affected by this regulation in terms of
developing AI-based solutions to network security. Innovation in
this domain often comes from niche companies that develop
narrow cybersecurity applications. It will become increasingly
hard for these developers to independently find good data sets
and to apply appropriate methods for compliance. Lastly, this
could have a collective impact on the network defense market.
The cybersecurity industry is increasingly turning to AI-based
solutions. However, additional restrictions could shift the
economic utility of advanced systems as research and
development becomes more costly. The restrictions could also
cause those entities with less resources to defer the use of AIbased cybersecurity solutions.
Despite these foreseeable consequences, it is important to
note that regulation is not a zero-sum game. The GDPR will
likely have some impact on the development and proliferation of
AI-based cybersecurity systems; however, it is also unlikely that
it will completely inhibit research and development in this field.
In some respects, the GDPR may enhance autonomous
cybersecurity. The GDPR is a data protection and data
governance regulation.172 No matter where one stands on the
spectrum of its utility, there is likely value in the GDPR as a tool
to promote awareness of cybersecurity issues. While there may
be other avenues to promote awareness, the GDPR has
nonetheless forced issues surrounding privacy and security to
the forefront of business considerations. At the heart of data
171. See Cybersecurity, AI, and Machine Learning: The Connection to GDPR,
supra note 155 (proposing that the tech industry, including cybersecurity
companies implementing AI, will need to “retool” products and services to adapt
to the GDPR era).
172. See Layton & Mclendon, supra note 124, at 235 (suggesting that the
GDPR is a data protection measure; not a privacy regulation).
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protection is the use of technical systems and such heightened
awareness could promote investment in data security systems.
As in many areas of law and technology, the only certainty is
often uncertainty and only time will tell how significant of an
impact the GDPR has on the development of AI and
cybersecurity.
2. Automated Information Sharing
Often, the value of information is limited by the extent to
which it can be shared. A known cyber threat indicator may be
useful to the entity that has it, but its value can quickly diminish
when other systems or entities are in the dark. As discussed in
Part I, information sharing of indicators and cyber threat
intelligence is a significant component of network defense. This
sharing can take many forms. Network defense systems can
automatically distribute information across systems and
networks, just as ISACs and other cyber threat sharing entities
can share a spectrum of relevant threat information. The GDPR,
in the interest of data protection, prescribes rules for
information sharing surrounding consent, explanation
requirements, and automated processes. However, it does not
fully hinder the exchange of information. In fact, portions of the
GDPR encourage sharing information related to network and
information security.173
Recital 49 of the GDPR notes that data controllers have a
legitimate interest in the “processing of personal data to the
extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purpose of
ensuring network and information security.”174 This recital
specifically identifies computer emergency response teams
(CERTs) and computer security incident response teams
(CSIRTs), as well as other public authorities and providers of
security technologies and services that would be considered data
controllers. Essentially, this encourages authorized information
sharing entities to share information that includes personal data
when they have a legitimate interest and when doing so is
necessary and proportionate to ensure network and information
173. See Information Sharing and Cooperation Enabled by the GDPR, MISP
(Jan.
30,
2018),
https://www.misp-project.org/compliance/gdpr
/information_sharing_and_cooperation_gdpr.html (“Recital 49 of the GDPR
confirms that CSIRTs [computer security incident response teams] are
encouraged to share information . . . .”).
174. GDPR, Recital 49.
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security.175 Although this is a recital, and not an enforceable
regulation, it suggests that the GDPR is not meant to inhibit
cyber threat information sharing.176 This concept is supported
by Article 32, which notes that controllers and processors “shall
implement appropriate technical and organizational measures
to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk . . . .” 177 In
the cybersecurity domain, information sharing is critical to
protecting data and is therefore likely to be considered an
essential measure to lowering risk.178
Although sharing of information is permitted, it is still
restricted by the GDPR. As noted, processing of data must be
necessary and proportional for the purpose of network and
information security. This most certainly creates some legal
uncertainty. What is necessary and proportionate for an ISAC
may be different for other parties in the cyber threat community,
such as network defense system vendors. Further, it raises
questions as to what is necessary and proportional, how this
determination is made, and by whom. The first place to look at
what could be necessary and proportional is the GDPR itself; in
particular, the principles set forth in Article 5 (lawfulness,
fairness, and transparency; purpose limitation; data
minimization; accuracy; storage limitation; and integrity and
confidentiality).179 Article 6(1)(e) also provides some guidance in
this regard.180 It notes that “processing shall be lawful only if
and to the extent that . . . [it] is necessary for the performance of
a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of

175. Information Sharing and Cooperation Enabled by the GDPR, supra
note 173.
176. Id.
177. GDPR, art. 32.
178. Information Sharing and Cooperation Enabled by the GDPR, supra
note 173 (“Information has to be perceived as [an] essential security measure to
lower the risk.”).
179. GDPR, art. 5; see also Information Sharing and Cooperation Enabled
by the GDPR, supra note 173 (noting that a processing activity should comply
with the six principles set forth in Article 5 of the GDPR).
180. See GDPR, art. 6(1)(e) (“Processing shall be lawful only if and to the
extent that at least one of the following applies: [ . . . ] (e) processing is necessary
for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise
of official authority vested in the controller . . . .”); see also Information Sharing
and Cooperation Enabled by the GDPR, supra note 173 (suggesting that the
legality of processing activities for CSIRTs may be based on Article 6(1)(e) of
the GDPR).
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official authority vested in the controller.”181 This is in no way
definitive, as there remains ambiguity in what may be in the
public interest and who may exercise official authority.
However, it supports the idea that the GDPR was in no way
meant to fully inhibit information sharing; rather, it seeks to
regulate how it may be done.
Similar to the development of AI-based cybersecurity
systems, only time will tell how significant the impact of the
GDPR may be on cyber threat information sharing. Increased
regulation will warrant a greater investment in technologies and
expertise to ensure compliance. However, it is in no way a
foregone conclusion that this would materially alter the course
of AI in the cybersecurity domain. A key consideration at this
point, is how information is actually shared. As noted in Part I,
network defense systems that are advertised as AI-driven still
require a significant level of human control. This means there
are analysts behind information sharing decisions who can strip
shareable data of personal data in the interest of compliance.
Although these processes are becoming more automated, there
is human control nonetheless. Moving forward, the demands of
an increased and dynamic threat landscape will require faster
decision-making and more automation. As AI-based
cybersecurity systems shift towards greater autonomy, they will
be more capable of meeting these demands but may also create
more questions for compliance.
C. THE AUTONOMY PROBLEM: WHEN DOES AI BREAK THE
MOLD?
Regardless of the domain, a common question for legal
scholars examining AI is whether AI will break the mold. Put
differently, when does AI make traditional legal regimes
obsolete? For example, autonomous driving vehicles may
someday disrupt traditional liability regimes related to strict
liability and negligence.182 The very nature of AI and the black
box problem could prevent the legal system from determining
whether there was a breach of duty, who was responsible, and
whether the breach caused the damage. This has required

181. GDPR, art. 6(1)(e).
182. See generally U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, TORTS OF
THE FUTURE: AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 3–6 (2018) (addressing the liability and
regulatory implications for autonomous vehicles).
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engineers and legal teams to rethink the foundational principles
of AI technologies.183 It also begs the question, when does AI
break the mold, if at all, for cybersecurity and data protection?
As noted in Part I, AI-based network defense systems are
still primarily detect-and-respond tools that require significant
human intervention.184 As they stand, these systems primarily
assist network defenders in analyzing data and making
connections to determine the context and nature of network
activity.185 The fact that there remain significant levels of
human control, as discussed in Section B, supports the idea that
compliance, although challenging, may be possible in today’s
system.186 GDPR compliance may hinder or slow progress, but
there are no indications that it will fully inhibit the development
and use of AI-based network defense systems. Notwithstanding,
there should be serious concern moving forward as to whether
compliance is feasible as the underlying technologies move
towards greater autonomy.
Ideally, these systems will be able to one day operate at
“cyber” speed. In fact, they may have to as malicious actors and
cyber criminals increasingly utilize AI to further nefarious
activity.187 The future may very well be a battle of algorithms
where competing systems act and react with little or no human
intervention. In terms of the GDPR, the question becomes
whether compliance is still feasible in the wake of greater
autonomy. The black box problem is just one example of an area
where compliance may be unachievable.188 The right to an
explanation holds little weight when an explanation is not
possible. This will require system developers to look for
technological solutions that promote transparency from the
beginning. Similarly, in the context of cyber threat information

183. See generally Buckner, supra note 97 (answering questions pertaining
to how engineers and legal teams must change their thinking about growing AI
technologies).
184. Supra Part I, Section B.
185. See Marty, supra note 60 (describing how machine learning algorithms
reveal security insights, safeguard data, and keep attackers out of systems).
186. Supra Part I, Section B.
187. See Danny Palmer, AI, Quantum Computing and 5G Could Make
Criminals More Dangerous Than Ever, Warn Police, ZDNET (July 19, 2019),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/ai-quantum-computing-and-5g-could-make
-criminals-more-dangerous-than-ever-warn-police/ (describing how AI can aid
criminals in exploiting vulnerable IoT devices).
188. Supra Part I, Section B.
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sharing, fully autonomous systems may excel at communicating
cyber threat information across systems and entities but may
also be incapable of demonstrating that personal data was not
shared. As suggested earlier, the only certainty is uncertainty.189
Absent innovative technologies that can assure protected data is
processed in accordance with regulations like the GDPR, it is
likely that AI-based cybersecurity systems will break the mold.
Moving forward, it is incumbent on engineers, lawmakers, and
scholars in their respective fields to pursue technology and
policies that balance the demands of cybersecurity with the need
to protect data.
For AI and cybersecurity, the problem space is immense,
and the implications are likely to be significant. The demands of
information security are often at odds with data privacy. 190
Meanwhile, rapid transformations in the threat landscape and
changes in technology make it difficult to understand the
broader picture of these competing domains.191 This poses
challenges for all parties involved trying to balance respective
interests and move society forward in the most effective fashion.
If done correctly, a balanced regulatory scheme may be able to
minimize data privacy issues in cybersecurity while prompting
the overall development and implementation of autonomous
information security systems.
D. ENGINEERING POLICY: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF
AUTONOMOUS CYBERSECURITY
Technology almost always outpaces the law. As technology
builds upon technology, governing mechanisms often struggle to
understand and account for the regulatory, ethical, and privacy
considerations surrounding emerging technologies. Moreover, a
lack of understanding of the technology itself often makes
formulating policy difficult. Technology often not only outpaces
our ability to defend but also our will to do so. AI is no exception.
From the Internet to cybersecurity to big data and AI, there are

189. See Tegmark, supra note 3 (noting that “the boundaries of AI can be
uncertain and have tended to shift over time”).
190. See generally Danny Guaman, Software and Services Engineering:
Privacy vs. Data Protection vs. Information Security, STRAST, https://
blogs.upm.es/sse/2016/11/01/privacy-vs-data-protection-vs-informationsecurity/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020) (discussing the differences between
information security and data privacy).
191. See id.
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intrinsic considerations related to data rights, privacy,
intellectual property, ethics, due process, social values, and
geopolitical concerns. Converging technologies complicate
regulatory structures at all levels. While the law is lost in the
fog of innovation, society struggles to harmonize the social
challenges presented by such disruptive technologies. For
machine learning and information security, the public puts a
premium on privacy while still expecting the benefits of AI
systems where the utility is derived from surpluses of consumer
data.192
Data privacy, or rather data protection, has received
significant attention in the wake of weekly large-scale data
breaches. This has caused technology firms and regulators to
warm to the idea of federal privacy legislation.193 In the interest
of cybersecurity and AI, there are several key considerations for
a federal privacy statute that may drive the future of
autonomous network defense. First, a federal privacy law may
benefit from certain exemptions for data processing related to
information security.194 This could include exemptions that
permit automated sharing of cyber threat indicators so long as
information is shared by approved or vetted systems or entities.
A second consideration is the inclusion of liability limitations for
small companies. While these exemptions would need to be
uniquely tailored so as to not to defeat the purpose of the
legislation, such exemptions would encourage smaller vendors
and companies to employ more advanced systems.195 Depending
on the state of the technology, the proliferation of more advanced

192. See generally April F. Doss, Why Changes in Data Science Are Driving
a Need for Quantum Law and Policy, and How We Get There, 14 ABA SCITECH
LAW. 38, 40 (2017).
193. See generally Dan Clark, Federal Data Privacy Legislation Is Likely
Next
Year,
Tech
Lawyers
Say,
LAW.COM
(Nov.
29,
2018),
https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/11/29/federal-data-privacy-legislationis-likely-next-year-tech-lawyers-say/ (detailing how tech companies and
regulators are releasing their own opinions on what data privacy legislation
should consist of).
194. See Nick Wallace & Daniel Castro, The Impact of the EU’s New Data
Protection Regulation on AI at 5, CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION (Mar. 27, 2018),
http://www2.datainnovation.org/2018-impact-gdpr-ai.pdf (suggesting that the
GDPR exempts certain forms of data processing when doing so is in the public
interest and that national governments should use this authority).
195. Id. at 3 (noting that smaller firms subject to the GDPR would be less
likely to adopt AI technologies because of the disproportionality associated with
fines under the regulation).

2020]

CYBERSECURITY, PRIVACY & AI

205

systems may benefit the cybersecurity industry as a whole and
shift the economics of cybersecurity in a positive fashion.
Another consideration would be to outline permitted uses of
anonymized196 and pseudonymized data.197 Because achieving
full anonymization of data can be challenging, entities may be
hesitant to use or share such information. Outlining permitted
uses of anonymized and pseudonymized data would reduce
uncertainty surrounding information sharing by clearly
establishing instances where anonymized data sharing is
appropriate. This would, however, also likely require
standardization of certain data anonymization techniques. A
similar consideration would be to define permitted uses of
repurposed data without additional consent.198 In some
instances, it is foreseeable that relevant information may be
collected for a particular purpose but may be useful at a later
time when the threat landscape has changed. Defining when it
would be permissible to repurpose this data without additional
consent would enable respective network defense entities to
more rapidly respond to a threat.
CONCLUSION
Breakthroughs in the development of AI technologies
continuously shift the application of AI from a conceptual dream
to a tangible reality. As each technological advancement is
reduced to practice, questions of law and policy surrounding AI
become more complex and convoluted. In the context of
information security, AI offers a spectrum of utility ranging from
196. See GDPR, Recital 26 (“To determine whether a natural person is
identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be
used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to
identify the natural person directly or indirectly.”).
197. See GDPR art.4, (5) (“For the purposes of this Regulation . . . (5)
‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a manner
that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject
without the use of additional information, provided that such additional
information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational
measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or
identifiable natural person . . . .”); see also Wallace & Castro, supra note 194
(suggesting that the EU should revise the right to erasure so that companies
are callable of deleting or anonymizing data in ways that do not impact the
underlying algorithms).
198. See Wallace & Castro, supra note 194 (suggesting that the EU should
amend the GDPR to allow for personal data to be repurposed without additional
consent).
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automation that empowers analysts to protect a network to
systems capable of thinking, learning, and acting in a manner
more intelligent than humans. As the threat landscape expands,
society is turning towards AI systems to combat growing cyber
threats. Meanwhile, society struggles to harmonize data privacy
concerns with technological realities. The GDPR has brought
this discussion to the pinnacle of business considerations by
regulating how data is to be protected. In today’s infant state,
AI-based cybersecurity systems appear capable of tackling the
challenge of compliance. However, the challenge becomes more
difficult as these systems achieve greater autonomy. As the
cybersecurity industry moves forward, it is paramount that
engineers, legal experts, and society look to balance competing
interests in cybersecurity and data privacy in order to realize the
benefits afforded by AI technologies.

